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Among early modern naturalists, “systems of nature” are the methods used by naturalists to classify living 
beings. Taxonomy, a word coined only in 1813 by de Candolle, refers to the classes or taxa that are 
obtained by applying one or another method of classification. Here I present some such methods in order 
to illustrate their variety (1.1). I also explain the difference between natural and artificial systems (1.2) 
and summarize contemporary debates on early modern taxonomy and essentialism (1.3). Early modern 
taxonomists are indeed not the only humans to classify natural beings (2.1). However, I try to describe the 
specificity of their activity (2.2 to 2.5). Finally, I review some cultural, political, and religious aspects of 
early modern taxonomies (3.1 to 3.5). 
Systems and taxonomies 
The variety of systems 
In Greek, sustêma meant a set of things such as celestial bodies or political entities. In the sixteenth 
century, the word system (systema in Latin, système in French) began to cover a more specific meaning in 
scientific circles, namely a set of propositions forming a coherent, although not necessarily true, image of 
the world. It is in that sense that Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), the Italian polymath, titled his book A 
Dialogue concerning the Two Chief World Systems (1632). In that case, a system is akin to a theory or a 
hypothesis. 
In botany or in zoology, the term “system” was sometimes used in that way. However, most of the time, 
until the eighteenth century, when naturalists spoke about systems, they meant methods of ordering. Thus, 
in his book Classes plantarum published in 1738, the Swedish naturalist Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778) 
explicitly compared systems aiming to classify plants proposed by about twenty of his predecessors (see 
image 1). In the preface, he underscored the practical purpose of the classificatory systems: “there are 
various systems, some prepared from the fruit, some from the petals, some from the calyx and stamens, 
yet all aim at the same purpose and target, namely to guide the amateur of botany to genera expediently” 
(quoted in Müller-Wille 2013, 309). 
Linnaeus discussed among others the systems of Joseph Pitton de Tournefort (1656-1708), Augustus 
Quirirmus Rivinus (1652-1723), and John Ray (1627-1705). In his Elements of Botany or Method for 
Recognizing Plants, the Frenchman Tournefort, director of the Jardin du Roi in Paris, proposed to classify 
plants following the structure of the corolla (i.e. the petals of the flower). He argued that looking to other 
parts of the plant would lead to “great embarrassments.” He thus chose that method primarily for a 
practical reason, namely that the petals are the most visible part of the plant (at least in those that are 
pollinated by animals). Thanks to its simplicity, his system encountered great success among European 
botanists. Rivinus, a German, born Augustus Bachmann, also proposed in his General Introduction to 
Botany (1690) a method of classification focusing on the petals. However, contrary to Tournefort, he 
looked at their number rather than their form. The Englishman Ray, for his part, was the first to 
distinguish in his classification between monocotyledons and dicotyledons, plants whose seeds contain 
respectively one or two embryonic leaves. 
 
 
[Image 1: In Classes plantarum (1738), Linnaeus presented and compared some twenty systems. The 
table of content was at the same time a schema ordering those systems. (Extract from the edition put on 
the Internet by Archive, no copyright.)] 
 
Linnaeus himself became famous for defending the “sexual system,” a method of classification based on 
the observation and comparison of the number, form, proportion and disposition of the reproductive 
organs of plants, the stamen and the pistil. However, he was not the first to use it: the Italian naturalist 
Andrea Cesalpino (1519-1603) had a direct influence on Linnaeus's choice that Charles Darwin (1809-
1882), the English father of the evolutionary thought, was to approve one century later. Notwithstanding, 
Linnaeus and Darwin had different rationales justifying the use of the sexual method. The former selected 
the sexual parts because they are essential not to the individual but to the kind. Indeed, without sexual 
organs, even if the individual could survive, the kind could not be perpetuated. Moreover, the sexual 
organs have two additional advantages: they are fairly stable in a given species, but highly variable 
between species, two important features for any classificatory character (Richards 2016). Finally, on an 
even more practical level, the sexual organs are in general easy to observe in plants. For his part, Darwin 
defended the sexual system with his evolutionary theory in mind. For him, a trait that emerged as a 
superficial adaptation to the milieu did not constitute a useful feature for classification. However, he 
argued in The Origin of Species (1859, ch. 13) that reproductive traits, unlike skin color or height for 
instance, are not likely to be adaptive to a particular environment and could thus serve as a good key for 
taxonomy. As we see, historians and philosophers of the sciences should not only look to the superficial 
similarities in the methods used; one must also study the various underlying justifications for those 
methods. 
 
Artificial and natural systems 
As a matter of definition, one can distinguish systems from taxonomies in that the one is a means for the 
other. Thus if a system is a method for classifying plants or animals, a taxonomy would be the whole set 
of categories or taxa obtained by following a given method. Even if this is a useful distinction, it should, 
however, be noted that early modern naturalists often used “system” for the resulting classification, since 
the term “taxonomy” only appeared in 1813, under the pen of the Swiss naturalist Augustin Pyrame de 
Candolle (1778-1841).  
Following the system used, the resulting taxonomy can vary significantly. It is in this sense that Linnaeus 
spoke of “artificial systems.” Ideally, taxonomists should uncover the “natural order” based on all the 
traits of the plants or animals. The “natural system” corresponds more to the intuitive way of classifying 
plants and animals, where overall appearances, not separated aspects, are taken into account. However, 
according to Linnaeus, as long as that intuitive classification lacks a clear justification, it cannot be used 
at a scientific level because it could lead to confusion as a result of its subjectivity. The artificial systems, 
among which Linnaeus counted his own sexual method, are only provisional, for lack of anything better. 
The French author George-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707-1788) adopted a harsher stand 
toward the natural systems. In a nominalist vein, he maintained that only individual organisms exist, 
while taxa such as genera, orders, and classes are only “in our imagination.” Therefore, according to 
Buffon, even if all the traits could be compared at the same time, this would not yield a natural system. 
However, as Phillip Sloan (1976) has argued, Buffon was less Lockean than Leibnizian. Contrary to the 
English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704), the French naturalist did not reject all categories. Like the 
German thinker Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), he would accept a category as real if it is 
grounded on an underlying reality. He believed that the various species, but not the other orders, were real 
in that sense, because the analogies between the individuals of a same species were based on the 
reproductive lineages they form. We could apply to Buffon what Justin Smith (2015, 236) says about 
Leibniz: a species is “a relatively isolated reproductive community, all of whose members may be said to 
be members of the same species not in virtue of any morphological resemblances (though they generally 
have these as well) but rather in virtue of shared origins.”  
Thus Buffon proposed a species concept, still used today in some contexts, not based on particular visible 
traits, but on the capacity of the organisms to give birth to non-sterile offspring. He did experiments with 
matings of donkeys and horses that yield mules, unable to give birth in their turn, thence the non-sterile 
provision in his definition of species. The French naturalist argued that if two organisms can interbreed, 
then they are part of a same lineage, i.e. a same species. However, that criterion was much less practical 
than the artificial systems based on visible traits. It is for instance difficult to test for interfertility in non-
domesticated organisms. Buffon himself found it hard to test for it in foxes and dogs, for instance, 
because the former did not wish to approach the latter. 
 
Essentialism 
The distinction between natural and artificial systems was an important one for Linnaeus’s 
contemporaries. However, historians and philosophers of science also draw a distinction between 
essentialist and non-essentialist taxonomies, a distinction that was not explicitly present in early modern 
naturalists’ controversies, even if it is somewhat linked with the distinction between natural and artificial 
systems. In 1965, David Hull published an article in two parts entitled “The Effect of Essentialism on 
Taxonomies - Two Thousand Years of Stasis.” In it, he argues that prior to Darwin, all naturalists, from 
Aristotle to Linnaeus, looked for the immutable essence of species and other taxa. Following essentialism 
as conceived by Hull, in each species (or other taxon), we could find criteria that are “severally necessary 
and jointly sufficient.” For instance, to be considerate chordate an animal must have: (a) a notochord, (b) 
a hollow dorsal nerve cord, (c) a post-anal tail, (d) a metameric segmentation and (e) a circulatory system. 
These features are severally necessary to define a chordate, which means that each one must be present. 
Inversely, if an animal possesses all these features, it must be a chordate. It is to say that those criteria are 
jointly sufficient to define that taxon. On the contrary, because evolutionary thought emphasises changes, 
a criterion present at a given moment could disappear some generations later. Therefore, for Darwin, 
there are no essential criteria that define a species. We can use some features provisionally in order to 
facilitate communication between scientists, but they are not a reality as such. Moreover, in the 
evolutionary thought, there are no essential differences but only gradual ones. Curiously, Hull does not 
discuss Buffon who is also anti-essentialist in a rather similar way to Darwin, even if writing a century 
earlier (note however that Buffon, contrary to Darwin, did not conceive the transformation of one species 
into another). 
More recently, Mary Winsor (2003) has criticized the historical analysis of Hull and others such as Ernst 
Mayr or Marc Ereshefsky. Following Winsor, we may affirm that taxonomies before Darwin were not as 
essentialist as those scholars describe them. Indeed, as a methodological stance, Linnaeus defended for 
instance that the naturalists should select within a species one individual and describe it as precisely as 
possible. The same within a genus: one should select a species and describe it in all its details. After that, 
other individuals or other species should only be compared with the paradigmatic individual or species. 
Similarities would never be perfect, but the individuals of a same species or the species of a same genus 
form what Winsor calls a “polythetic group” akin to the concept of family resemblance in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. By using a method of exemplars, the naturalists did not consider the categories totally 
hermetic. Lorraine Daston (2004) notes that the nineteenth century botanists would continue to use a 
similar method, even if instead of looking for a paradigmatic type, which needed the comparison of 
multiple plants to find the best exemplar, they would begin to follow the rule of priority: the first type 
used in publication would be considered the type specimen, what is now called the “holotype.” Darwin’s 
non-essentialist conception of species matched thus, according to Winsor, a well-established practice 
among naturalists. 
The difference between Hull’s and Winsor’s interpretations of early modern taxonomists could be linked 
to their respective practices in the history of science. Hull focused on the theoretical aspects of the 
scientists whereas Winsor followed  the “practice turn” in science studies proposed by, among others, 
Steven Shapin and Bruno Latour. The latter recommends that, instead of looking to what scientists say 
they do, scholars should look to what they concretely do. The practical turn pushed historians to pay more 
attention to the methodologies used, as Winsor did when reading Linnaeus. In fact, it could be that 
Linnaeus defended a kind of essentialism at a theoretical level (as studied by Hull) while following a non-
essentialist method in his practice (Latour [1988] argues that such “double-talk” is a recurrent feature of 
scientific endeavours). 
Here, we may add that Linnaeus also wanted to construct a taxonomy of minerals, a project that he never 
carried out (even today, no such classification exists). Louis Daubenton (1716-1799), a protégé of 
Buffon, noted that minerals lack both individuality and sexual reproduction. Consequently, he argued that 
in mineralogy “there is no such thing as essential resemblance,” referring to analogies based on an 
underlying reality as explained in the previous section (quoted in Laudan 1989, 226). The method based 
on exemplars was thus not functional. 
 
The specificity of early modern taxonomies 
The classificatory mind 
Is there something particular about the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century enthusiasm for taxonomies? 
Anthropologists and psychologists argue that the classificatory mind is innate and universal. In an 
evolutionary understanding, it seems beneficial for survival to distinguish one plant or animal species 
from another. Even animals appear to classify beings in order to adapt their reactions: a rabbit, for 
instance, runs away from a fox, but not from a sheep. The rabbit is thus able to distinguish those two 
species. The same is true for humans who must be able to distinguish, say, an edible from a noxious plant. 
In that broad sense, classifications bear a practical and survival value. Based on his observations among 
the Itza Maya of Mexico and on others collected by ethnotaxonomists (i.e. anthropologists studying the 
taxonomies of non-Western societies), Scott Atran (1990) has shown that all human languages distinguish 
between 250 and 800 different plant species. Moreover, in all languages, there seems to be an analogous 
structure of classification with at least two classificatory levels that correspond to the vernacular species 
and the super-classes, such as birds or mammals, that include the lower classes. 
Those numbers agree with what we find in the Natural History of Pliny the Elder (23-79 CE). This 
treatise, which became important during the Renaissance, counted around 500 different plant species. In 
1551, the German Hieronymus Bock (1498-1554) published an herbal with 806 species, attaining then 
the upper level of folk-taxonomies. Because of that concordance in numbers, some ethnotaxonomists such 
as Brent Berlin (1992) supposed that the taxonomical works of the Renaissance simply put on paper the 
folk-taxonomies of their time and culture. However, the next generations of taxonomists arrived at the 
limits of human cognitive capacities by cataloging more than 1,000 species. In his 1623 thesaurus, the 
Swiss author Caspar Bauhin (1560-1624) distinguished more than 6,000 plant species. However, some, 
such as Antoine-Laurent de Jussieu (1748-1836), tried to collect various species together in order to 
obtain a classification of about 100 categories, coming back, as ethnotaxonomists emphasise, to a 
memorisable number similar to the numbers found in folk-taxonomies. 
 
The lack of a communal experience 
However, even if there are underlying cognitive processes and evolutionary impulses for classifying 
natural beings, it is important to stress the specificity of the early modern taxonomic endeavours. 
Ironically, by aiming to show the universality of the classificatory mind, ethnotaxonomists are 
particularly helpful for pointing out the specificities of the early modern classifications of natural beings.  
A first novel aspect of early modern taxonomies is the absence of any communal experience. Normally, a 
child learns what a dog is at the moment he sees a dog with an adult, who points at it while saying the 
name of the vernacular species. The users of folk-taxonomies thus presuppose a communal experience: 
the speaker and the hearer are together pointing to an observable reality. This was still the case when 
Pliny and Dioscorides (who lived approximately between 30 and 90 CE) wrote their medical treatises. As 
Brian Ogilvie (2003) explains, those authors presupposed that their potential readers already knew the 
plants they spoke about. It is therefore that they did not provide any detailed botanical descriptions. 
The first generation of Renaissance botanists, however, did not share that knowledge. The Germans 
Euricius Cordus (1486-1535) and Leonhart Fuchs (1501-1566), for instance, explicitly tried to find 
which plants those ancient authors had in mind. Early modern naturalists, thus, became sensitive to the 
fact that their readership would not necessarily know which plants or animals they were writing about. 
Those Renaissance botanists did not provide taxonomies strictly speaking, they only proposed more 
precise descriptions of the plants mentioned in the ancient books. Ogilvie argues that the descriptions 
were meant to facilitate the designation of the plants for someone who has not seen any of them 
previously. So, contrary to Berlin’s assumption as seen in the previous section, early botanical works did 
not simply put on paper the oral knowledge of their period. 
The next generation, constituted among others by Bock and Valerius Cordus (1515-1544), the son of 
Euricius Cordus, described additional plants that were not in the Ancient books. Still more species of 
plants appeared from Western Europe, but also from other continents through colonial enterprises. 
Taxonomies fulfilled a new function, that of facilitating recognition in commercial exchanges. The 
descriptions provided by naturalists allowed physicians, tradesmen, or collectors to recognise a specimen 
of a plant or animal he has not seen before. Daniel Margócsy (2014) argues that this commercial use of 
natural descriptions explains the difference between the descriptions of plants and small animals that were 
commonly exchanged and those of big animals such as elephants that were rarely sold. The latter 
contained more mythological and cultural aspects than the former. Margócsy illustrates that contrast by 
comparing the description by the Italian author Ulisse Aldrovandi (1522-1605) of the Egyptian bull and 
the botanical descriptions by Fuchs (see image 2). More specifically, the medical usage of plants can 
explain why the taxonomies were first and better developed in botany than in zoology. 
 
 
[Image 2 : Margócsy (2014) compares the description of the Egyptian bull by Aldrovandi (a) and the 
botanical descriptions of Fuchs (b). The former were in full sentences and comprised heterogeneous 
information, some physical, other related to cultural habits or mythical considerations. Even the 
illustration did not serve identification. In contrast, in the botanical treatise by Fuchs, the presentation is 
standardized and sticks to the physical description. On the pages that follow, Fuchs provides two realistic 
pictures of the digitalis. Image (a) is extracted from Aldrovandi, Quadrupedum omnium bisulcorum 
historia (1642), p. 242 (digitized by Google, no copyright). Image (b) is extracted from Fuchs, De 
historia stirpium commentarii insignes (1542), p. 892 (digitized by Google, no copyright).] 
 
Abstraction from the environment 
Another specificity of early modern taxonomies, linked to the lack of communal experience, is the 
progressive abstraction of the environment. Traditionally, animals and plants were described at the same 
time as their environment. The habitat could serve as an indicator of the species. However, early modern 
taxonomists excluded explicitly the environment from their descriptions. In that fashion, Tournefort 
explains that the resemblances used to classify plants “should be deduced solely from the closest sign of 
relationship, i.e. from the structure of one of the parts of the plant, and must pay no attention to more 
distant signs of relationship that can be found between certain plants, such as the possession of similar 
[medicinal] virtues, or the place in which they occur” (as quoted in Sloan 1972, p. 40). 
Cetaceans constituted a case in point. As Aldemaro Romero (2012) explains, Aristotle (384-322 BCE) 
made observations on marine animals during his stay in Lesbos. He noted that whales and dolphins fulfill 
their functions in a way similar to “quadrupeds.” He classified them in a category separated from the fish. 
However, he did not put it in the same as the “quadrupeds” (at that time, the class “mammals” did not 
exist). Pliny the Elder sometimes classified whales and dolphins as fish, sometimes he distinguished 
them. The French author Pierre Belon (1517-1564) provided descriptions of the placenta, the hair, and 
the teats of a dolphin, but he did not compare it to the terrestrial animals. The Englishman Edward 
Wotton (1492-1555) and the Frenchman Guillaume Rondelet (1507-1566) classified the dolphins with 
the fish explicitly because of their habitat. In the next century, both Edward Tyson (1651-1708) and Ray 
dissected a porpoise. The former was not interested in taxonomies. In contrast, Ray tried to classify all 
living beings. In 1693, he categorically separated cetaceans from the fish: “For except as to the place on 
which they live, the external form of the body, the hairless skin [sic] and progressive swimming motion, 
they have almost nothing in common with fishes, but remaining characters agree with the viviparous 
quadrupeds” (quoted in Romero 2012, p. 21, in fact, cetaceans do have hairs as Belon already knew). 
Finally, based on the work of the Swedish Peter Artedi (1705-1935) that he met in Amsterdam, Linnaeus 
classified the cetaceans and some terrestrial animals in the same category by inventing the taxon 
Mammelia or mammals (on that category, see section 3.4 on gender). 
The history of the classification of cetaceans shows how difficult it was to abstract the animals from their 
natural environment. Moreover, for, say, fishermen, putting cetaceans in the same category as terrestrial 
animals makes no sense. For their use, cetaceans are prey just as sharks are. If the taxonomists could 
bypass the fishermen's intuition, it is because they studied specimens in their cabinets. The specimens 
were thus already abstracted from their environment. That was also the case for the plants or insects that 
were exchanged. A botanist could study a plant from a country to which he never went. Thus, for 
taxonomists, abstraction was concrete before being theoretical – when they described their specimens, 
these were already physically abstracted from their environment. 
 
 
The overload of information and the terminological confusion 
As we have seen above, another important difference between folk taxonomies and early modern 
taxonomies is a quantitative one. Due to a new social and material context, the number of known animal 
and vegetal beings grew rapidly. In early modern Europe, the epistolary culture permitted the 
collaboration of scholars across national borders. Moreover, printing allowed the circulation of much 
more information more rapidly. In addition, the colonial enterprise and the Christian missions also made 
new knowledge available. Specimens from previously unknown species were regularly sent from the 
Indies or the Americas. Often European scholars would try to subsume novelties in already known 
classes: in that fashion maize would become “corn” and cougars “lions” (Smith 2015, p. 114). However, 
as Pedro Franco Dávila (1711-1786), an Ecuadorian savant that would become the first director of the 
Royal Cabinet of Natural History in Madrid, lamented: “one is confronted by Species that do not fit into 
any established Genus, or that seem to belong to several at once” (quoted in Earle 2016, p. 428). The 
colonial exchanges sharply increased the number of known species which were not always easy to 
classify. 
As Staffan Müller-Wille and Isabelle Charmantier (2012) argue, Linnaeus was very conscious of the 
information overload. He invented and tried out techniques to cope with that problem. For instance, he 
left blank spaces in his tables in case new species were discovered. However, those spaces were often so 
rapidly filled that they did not prove a very useful tool. It is so that Linnaeus became the first scientist to 
use index cards similar to those that librarians were then beginning to use (see image 3). He put those 
separated index cards in boxes ordered by genus. New information could easily be added with a new card. 
In a paradoxical movement, such techniques did not only passively gather information, but encouraged 
the multiplication of information. As the historians note, “the very people who suffered from information 
overload tended to be the same people who created it” (Müller-Wille and Charmantier 2012, p. 4). 
 
 
[Image 3 : As explained by Müller-Wille and Charmantier (2012), Linnaeus was the first scientist to use 
index cards to manage, but also to contribute to, the overload of information. (Image from the page « The 
Linnaean Society Library » on Frank Norman’s blog : < http://occamstypewriter.org/trading-
knowledge/2014/02/13/the-linnaean-society-library/ >, under Creative Common license.)] 
 
Linked to the information overload, the early modern naturalists were confronted with another problem: 
that of terminological confusion (Ogilvie 2003). Each new plant or animal species needed a name. 
Because the naturalist community was very active, the same species was often discovered in parallel by 
various authors who gave it different names. Faced with the terminological explosion from the mid-16th 
century, the botanical works began each entry with a section entitled nomina where the reader could find 
the various names given to the plant under discussion. At that moment there appeared also the first 
dictionaries of synonyms such as that by the Swiss Conrad Gessner (1416-1565) published in 1542: the 
Catalogue of Plants in Latin, Greek, German and French. However, it is Caspar Bauhin who provided 
the most complete list of synonyms in his 1623 Pinax Theatri Botanici, whose title described it as “an 
index to the works of Theophrastus, Dioscorides, and the botanists who have written in the last century.” 
However, those lists of synonyms could only be useful during a short time. Scholars began to look for 
more standardised manners of naming species and taxa in order to avoid terminological confusion. In the 
tenth and most important edition of the Systema naturae (1758), Linnaeus proposed the binomial naming 
system still used today, although in an adapted form (some would argue that the exclusion of vernacular 
names from taxonomical nomenclatures is a form of “linguistic imperialism,” as explained in section 3.3). 
Margócsy (2014, p. 41) argues that the generalization of illustrations in botanical treatises was another 
response to the terminological confusion. The drawings could be recognized by botanists speaking 
different vernacular languages. 
 
The effect of printing 
Jack Goody (1977) has analyzed the impact of writing on the classificatory mind. He notes that the need 
to classify crocodiles for instance as terrestrial or water animals appears only in societies that make 
written lists. In oral societies, because there is no stable material trace, it is easier to describe the animal 
sometimes as terrestrial and at other times as living in water without noticing the contradiction. It is the 
reason why some anthropologists such as Roy Ellen (2017) criticize the stance of Atran and Berlin who 
did not take into consideration the impact of writing and other technologies of knowledge on taxonomies. 
However, although natural philosophers wrote down treatises long before the early modern era, they 
never approached the systematicity of the seventeenth and eighteenth century naturalists. Some historians 
have tried to describe a continuous progression from Aristotle to the early modern taxonomists. However, 
in his History of Animals, Aristotle did not try to define the various living species. The aim of the Greek 
philosopher was to show that a particular form (eidos) is necessary for the good functioning of the given 
organism. His aim was thus not definitional but functional. In the Middle Ages, Aristotle was a leading 
influence for the natural philosophers. However, they tried to apply the method of logical division 
presented in his Categories to define living beings. Ironically, Aristotle himself explicitly rejected that 
method for describing animals and plants. In his Part of Animals, he states that the various species are 
“defined by many differences, not according to dichotomy” (as quoted in Richards 2016, p. 41). The 
medieval philosophers were more interested in the logical aspects of definitions than in the animals they 
were describing. Nevertheless, during the Middle Ages, there were bestiaries and guides for falconry with 
animal descriptions, but there was nothing approaching the taxonomical and systematic endeavors starting 
in the Renaissance. Writing alone can thus not explain the taxonomical enterprise of early modern 
Europe. 
By prolonging and amplifying some effects of writing, printing was also an important factor in the 
emergence of modern taxonomies. As already mentioned in the previous section, printing participated in 
the creation of the information overload. However, as Walter Ong and Elizabeth Eisenstein have argued, 
books and journals have shaped early modern sciences in other essential ways. Ong explains for instance 
that printing popularized dichotomic schemas, first as a pedagogical technique but later also as a scientific 
tool as such. In botany, as studied by Holger Funk (2014), we also find such schemas in treatises by the 
Otto Brunfels (1488-1534), Benoît Textor (1520-1565) or Mathias de l’Obel (1538-1616). However, 
the most famous example of dichotomous schemas in botany are those of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-
1829) in his 1778 French Flora (see image 4). This is only one example of how printing instilled a form 
of presentation, but also a particular way of thinking about plants and animals. 
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[Image 4: Jean-Baptiste Lamarck is famous for using dichotomic schemas in botany. However, as Funk 
(2014) shows, he was not the first to do so. (Image extracted from Fleurs françaises, 1778, digitized by 
Google, no copyright.)] 
 
For economical reasons linked to the printing industry, Linnaeus also changed the underlying philosophy 
of systematists. Before him, taxonomists published their works at an older age, when they were 
considered completed. In contrast, Linnaeus defended the idea that taxonomy is essentially a collective 
and progressive endeavor. It is therefore important that everyone agree on terminology and methodology. 
Moreover, this justified his early and continuous publications that aimed to trigger gathering of 
information. During his life span, he published for instance no less than twelve editions of his Systema 
naturae. As Müller-Wille and Charmantier (2012) explain, Linnaeus published so many editions also in 
order to make a living. By constraining all naturalists to use the last edition to communicate efficiently, he 
was able to sell his books widely. Linnaeus thus modified the epistemological ethos of the taxonomists 
due, in part at least, to the economy of the printed book. 
 
Cultural, religious and political aspects of taxonomies 
I have already presented some cultural and political aspects of taxonomies. I noted for instance the 
influence of commercial exchanges on botanical and zoological descriptions (see section 2.3). I have also 
underlined the importance of the print culture and the role of colonialism on the information overload and 
the development of systematicity (see sections 2.4 and 2.5). Now I wish to explore more explicitly the 
links between society and taxonomies in early modern Europe. 
 
Colonialism 
Since the 1990s, historians of science have investigated the interconnections of knowledge and empire. 
James McClennal and François Regourd (2000) speaks of a “colonial machine” based on a “colonial 
science bureaucracy.” In a similar vein, Londa Schiebinger and Claudia Swan (2007) coined the phrase 
“European Colonial Science Complex.” These scholars emphasize that scientists, even when not 
intentionally participating in the colonial enterprise, facilitated it. They argue for instance that there are 
parallel processes of abstraction in the sciences (see section 2.3) and of commodification in the economic 
exchanges essential to the colonial project. Both processes produce objects, plants or animals, which are 
valued independently of the environment and relations that let them emerge in the first place. In addition, 
by intentionally ignoring the environment, early modern taxonomists participated in the colonial narrative 
maintaining that the “discovered” lands were previously virgin and unoccupied. Historians also recount 
how travelers actively eliminated from their account the local encounters that made their travels possible. 
The early modern taxonomists thus took part in the systematic neglect of indigenous knowledge, letting 
the belief that only Europeans were gifted with intelligence grow. Historians also underline the great 
number of royal gardens and curiosities (above I have mentioned two such scientific centers, one in Paris 
and another in Madrid). This shows that the colonial powers knew the importance of botanical (and to a 
lesser extent zoological) knowledge for their expansion and enrichment. They were even inclined to 
invest in such scientific activities. 
 
The place of humans and racism 
Should naturalists add humans to their zoological classifications? In the Middle Ages, humans were 
considered more akin to angels than animals. Aldrovandi, Gessner or Ray did not explicitly exclude 
humans from their taxonomies, but they did not mention them in their works. Belon underlined the 
similarity of birds’ wings and human hands and some decades later Tyson provided a detailed comparison 
of the human skeleton and that of what he called an “orang-outang” (but that we call a chimpanzee 
today). He affirmed that both species are physically indistinguishable. Those anatomical descriptions 
insisted on the animal nature of the human kind. Linnaeus was the first to add the human species in a 
taxonomical treatise, namely, in the tenth edition of his Systema naturae. He chose to name it, following 
his binomial system (see section 2.3), Homo sapiens. This explicit inclusion of humans in the “tree of 
life” became important for nineteenth-century biology. 
Once Linnaeus placed humankind among the animals, he also subdivided it into “varieties”: americanus, 
europaeus, asiaticus and afer (for Africans). Some, such as Thierry Hoquet (2014), have argued that 
Linnaeus presents the first strictly speaking racial discourse even without using the word “race.” Indeed, 
he defines the human varieties by both physical and behavioral or cultural traits. Smith believes that 
Linnaeus exemplifies a “double movement” proper to racial thought: “both an insertion of ‘man’ into a 




Taxonomies bear many traces of their cultural environment, notably in the names given to taxa. For 
instance, Greek poetry is the etymological source for a considerable number of species names in 
Linnaeus. The latter invented some rules to follow while naming a species (see section 2.3). Among them, 
the name giver should privilege Latin or Greek etymons. That led some historians to argue that early 
modern taxonomies, intentionally or unconsciously, practiced a form of “linguistic imperialism.” For 
instance, Joseph Needham (1986, p. 168) stated that “it has to be admitted that Linnaeus was the evil 
genius of this Europocentrism.” Schiebinger would argue in the same way that the rules offered by 
Linnaeus promoted the denial of non-European knowledge: only Europeans seem to know and to name 
species. However, this thesis is perhaps excessive, as Alexandra Cook (2010) argues. She notes that 
Linnaeus wanted Latin names simply in order to be able to communicate with his colleagues in Europe. 
Notwithstanding, he did not want his nomenclature to replace the vernacular names that could continue to 
be used variously in each region. Moreover, Linnaeus often contravenes his professed rules, by using 
Chinese etymologies, for instance. 
 
Gender 
Schiebinger (1989) makes a similar argument regarding gender. By using male proper names, 
taxonomists engraved male domination in the development of the European sciences. She also works out 
how the taxon “Mammal” was coined by Linnaeus in the tenth edition of his Systema naturae and how 
that term was taken by the broader society. By calling the taxon in this way, the botanist accentuated one 
aspect of the animals included in that category. He was conscious that he could also call them the “hairy” 
or “those that have three auditory ossicles,” two attributes exclusive to the individuals of that taxon. 
Those attributes would have been even better than Mammalia (to use the Latin word coined by him), 
which refers to the breast only half of the individuals of the taxon possess. However, if he chose to insist 
on that feature, it is because he was not only a botanist but also a practicing physician participating in a 
controversy around wet-nurses. In 1752, just six years before coining the term Mammalia, he published a 
dissertation on what he saw as the crime of these workers. He insisted on the importance of breastfeeding 
by the natural mother. By describing humans as breastfeeders, he hoped to incite women to breastfeed 
their children themselves. Moreover, it was the female part of humanity that inscribed it in the animal 
kingdom. In contrast, adds Schiebinger, the specificity of humans was from the male part. Indeed, by 
naming the human species Homo sapiens, Linnaeus chose intelligence as the essential difference defining 
the species, an attribute that was considered masculine at that time. The example of mammals and Homo 
sapiens shows how “natural” categories can be founded on cultural or political biases. 
 
Religion 
Peter Harrison has studied the interactions between the development of the sciences and the history of 
religion in Europe. In a 2009 article, he tries to show that the taxonomist's quest was also influenced by 
religious debates. Genesis 2:19 teaches that God “would bring [all the animals] to man to see what he 
would call them, and the man chose a name for each one.” With the help of God, Adam had an intuitive 
knowledge of the essence of things, so he could name all species efficiently. However, that knowledge 
would be lost after the Fall. In the sixteenth century, Christian scholars such as Francis Bacon (1561-
1623), deemed it a moral obligation to recover that knowledge. Some of Linnaeus’s contemporaries, such 
as Albrecht von Haller (1708-1777) or Alexander Garden (1730-1791), compared the Swedish botanist 
to Adam, the first name giver. They did this in order to underline the exaggerated pretensions of his 
endeavour. Linnaeus never compared himself explicitly with the Biblical figure. However, he considered 
himself to be divinely inspired as well. Moreover, even if his system was not entirely natural or intuitive, 
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